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New Hampshire: The Premarital
Testing Debacle
Susan D. Epstein
In 1987, the New Hampshire Division ofPublic Health Services had a bill introduced in
the legislature to improve contact tracing and establish statewide public education on HIV
infection, transmission, and disease control. This article traces the bill, and issues sur-
rounding the bill, through the legislative process andfocuses on an unexpected interven-
tion by the governor through a proposed amendment to add mandatorypremarital testing.
Its conclusions offer advice to other states on how best to avoidpolitical exploitation of
AIDS/HIV issues.
By the summer of1987, the AIDS issue in New Hampshire had become devoted to every-
thing but AIDS. It revolved aroundpresidentialpreferences , a governor 's show of
strength, and legislative grandstanding. Substantive progress in curbing thefurther trans-
mission ofthe virus through education, testing, and behavioral changes had been stymied.
How did this issue become so hotly politicized in New Hampshire ? Can our sister New
England states learnfrom our experience? Can the issue be better handled?
This article will trace a benign billfrom its inception through its demise in the legisla-
ture. It will illustrate how the absence ofapian and ofconsensus can leave this sensitive
issue open to political exploitation.
Late in the summer of 1986, top staff in the Division of Public Health's Disease Con-
trol Bureau met with the agency's deputy director to ask for any available money
to deal with AIDS. The Division's AIDS program was, and still is, financed entirely
through federal funds granted for services to the high-risk population: male homosexuals,
hemophiliacs, intravenous drug users, and their partners. The number of seropositive
AIDS tests was beginning to climb steeply, and transmission had begun to move into the
general population. Like many other rural states, New Hampshire had had a slow start-up
on AIDS, but recent test results had indicated that the rate was escalating rapidly. The
Division was without resources — staff, supplies, equipment, expense money — to deal
with this rise.
'
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To carry out its work with the high-risk population, the Division had hired one health
educator, one nurse, a part-time laboratory person, and a part-time secretary. Other Dis-
ease Control staff had been diverted to deal with the ever expanding cries for help with the
disease, and staff energies were stretched dangerously thin. The number of positive tests
in 1986 was projected to quadruple from 1985. 2 No other resources could be redeployed.
The Disease Control staff had other concerns besides money. Through a network of
volunteers at five clinic sites and physicians around the state, word had already come
back: instances of confidentiality breached, patients attempting suicide after receiving a
positive initial test result over the phone, hasty and illogical local policies implemented to
deal with fear of AIDS. The Division had received entreaties from local and state prisons,
the state's reform school, its mental hospital, drug abuse units, private and public hospi-
tals and specialty hospitals, police units, schools, insurance companies, and others for
help in developing policies and guidelines for staff, patients, customers, travelers, and
inmates. Nowhere in state law was the Division authorized to take these initiatives, and
nowhere had the legislature or the governor made clear whose job it was to handle all the
issues around AIDS.
The Bill
Following consultation with the director and the commissioner of the Department of
Health and Human Services, a bill was drafted to outline the duties of the Division in
dealing with the disease. The governor's staff was notified that an AIDS bill would be
added to those bills coming from Public Health. A small AIDS task force, chaired by the
commissioner, received the preliminary draft. The chairpersons of both House and Senate
Health Committees were notified, as was the state's health/medical community.
Public Health had only three weeks to prepare the bill for submission for a September
deadline. The Division felt that the bill should address the duties assigned to Public
Health as well as issues relating to those duties, but not tackle those other areas which
have been affected by AIDS, such as housing, labor, employment, and civil rights. The
Division also determined that the bill would address disease prevention and disease con-
trol issues for AIDS but would not discuss those at high risk and the specifics of transmis-
sion. In other words, sex, homosexuality, and drug use were not mentioned.
The bill filed in the fall had six major components:
1
.
The Division of Public Health Services was authorized to develop AIDS-
education materials for schools, colleges, health care providers and insti-
tutions, state agencies, business and industry, the media, and the public.
2. The Division was to assist all these groups in developing policies and pro-
grams to deal with AIDS.
3. The Division was to conduct laboratory testing for HIV infection already
in place, but was authorized to certify outside laboratories to conduct
further testing and reporting.
4. A highly specific informed-consent provision was included to combat the
increasingly prevalent practice of testing someone's blood for HIV with-
out the person's knowledge, a practice leading to some tragic responses.
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5. A tight confidentiality plan was included to safeguard test results. Confi-
dentiality provisions were backed up with penalties and liability provi-
sions.
6. A total of $339,000 was requested for FY'88 and $325,000 for FY'89,
virtually doubling the size of the existing program.
Strategy
The strategy for the bill was based on the assumption that it would take its hardest hits in
the financial area, given the New Hampshire State Legislature's traditional reluctance to
fund new programs. Further, the Division assumed that the purpose of the bill was so
inoffensive that little if any restructuring would be done with its substance.
With this logic, the Division requested sponsors from four key sources: several House
sponsors from the House Health and Human Services Committee; one member from
House Appropriations; and on the Senate side, Elaine Krasker, the new chairperson of the
Senate's Health and Welfare Committee, who was to play a pivotal role, and two members
of the Senate's powerful Finance Committee, Sen. Frank Torr and Sen. Ed Dupont, the
new majority leader. With support in Appropriations, and with the assurance of key con-
servative votes to add to more liberal votes in Senate Finance, the Division hoped to pave
a smooth passage. The legislative plan had been fashioned by Sen. Elaine Krasker, a sea-
soned representative and a former Democratic whip in the House, newly elected to the
Senate. Through her efforts, Representative Ramsay and Senators Torr and Dupont joined
the team.
Legislative Process
The bill was well received at a large hearing before the House Health and Human Services
Committee. Chairman Matthew Sochalski had placed some key committee members as
sponsors on the bill, in addition to the committee's six-term ranking Democrat, Rep.
Marion Copenhaver. A subcommittee headed by a retired pediatrician, Rep. Robert
Wilson, met to iron out some of the major issues raised in the committee hearing.
A major point of contention was the penalty provision, aimed at anyone who breached
confidentiality concerning a patient tested for HIV infection. For obvious reasons, repre-
sentatives of the New Hampshire Medical Society and the New Hampshire Hospital Asso-
ciation wanted the provision deleted. The subcommittee needed to weigh their plea against
that of the Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Rights (CAGLR), which argued that without this
legal protection, they would refuse to be tested. The recommended version was a compro-
mise, maintaining the penalties but stipulating that a person must "purposely" violate
confidentiality in order to have them apply. A section was added, requested by the correc-
tions commissioner, to permit testing without informed consent in prisons and mental
institutions when the testing would be necessary to place and manage the individual within
the facility. A troublesome section specifying at what age a minor's parents must be told
of test results was deleted, permitting other statutes already on the books to apply. Having
been amended but still intact, the bill sailed through the House Health and Human Serv-
ices Committee and, some weeks later, through House Appropriations. The issue of
mandatory testing was not raised.
By the time of the appropriations hearing, concerns that the bill's budget would be
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diced up had vanished. Those who had raised concerns about substantive issues in the bill
had their concerns dealt with by the compromises in committee. Appropriations was
supportive and sent the bill back to the full House, where it passed on a voice vote.
Then the bomb dropped. The director of Public Health Services received a call on
Monday, April 6, from the governor's legal counsel, indicating that the governor was
going to hold a press conference on the AIDS bill on the following day and warning the
director not to "shoot [them] in the foot." There had been no prior discussion with the
director of Public Health Services or with his boss, the commissioner of Health and Hu-
man Services. There was no indication as to what the governor was planning to say, and
no request for opinion from Public Health— not even an invitation to attend the press
conference. Several phone calls ascertained that neither the bill's sponsors nor the medi-
cal community had been consulted.
On Tuesday, April 7, a staffer from the Division, armed with a tape recorder, went to
the governor's press conference to find out more. At the conference, the governor,
flanked by the Speaker of the House and the president of the Senate, Republicans all, said
he planned to introduce an amendment to the AIDS bill which would require AIDS testing
before couples would be permitted to marry. He indicated that the amendment would
reinstate the old syphilis premarital testing requirement, since it could serve as a legal
precedent for requiring HTV testing. He repeated several times that AIDS was a legal
issue, a political issue, a civil rights issue, but not a medical issue. Finally, to the distress
of Public Health staff who had been struggling for three and a half years to quell the
spread of the disease, he noted that his measure was a start and a small beginning. 3
Of the many questions from the press that followed, only one raised the prescient issue.
Veteran State House reporter Donn Tibbetts, of the Manchester Union Leader, asked,
with due respect to the state's three foremost political leaders, where were the medical
people who supported or requested this measure. Governor Sununu simply repeated his
claim that AIDS was not a medical issue. 4
IfAIDS had not been a political issue before the governor's press conference, it became
one immediately afterward. Legislative sponsors, including Reps. Marion Copenhaver,
Trudy Butler, Larry Chase, and Robert Wilson, as well as Senator Krasker, were in-
censed. The state medical society hastily called together the infectious disease physicians,
who prevailed upon the society's Executive Committee to oppose the measure. At Public
Health, which had been muzzled by orders not to shoot [the governor's office] in the foot,
press calls were passed to the governor's office, and the Division's role in working on its
highest priority bill ended.
Press reaction to the proposed premarital testing plan included criticism from medical
specialists and no comment from Public Health. 5 The governor then announced that he
would veto the bill unless it came to his desk with his premarital amendment included. 6
Some local reporters picked up on Vice President George Bush's statement, made a day
after Sununu 's to USA Today, supporting premarital testing and remarked on the coinci-
dence, as Sununu serves as Bush's campaign chairman in New Hampshire. 7
Criticism of the proposed amendment by the medical community was swift and damn-
ing. Using data from Public Health's current testing, the critics pointed out that of 22,000
people who would be required to be tested, only 2 would turn out to be truly positive. All
the other people who tested positive— 218 — and their families and friends, would go
through hell in that interval between the first positive test and the ultimately negative
result. Critics questioned why a low-risk group, monogamous couples already committed
to a long-term sexual relationship, should be compelled to be tested. The medical commu-
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nity voiced concerns about the premise that premarital testing for syphilis would be rein-
stated. The law mandating premarital syphilis testing by the state had been repealed in
1981 ; there had not been a positive test for over five years. 8
The governor's threat to veto the AIDS bill if it arrived without his amendment drew
indictment from newspapers around the state. The Concord Monitor headlined its edi-
torial "Cross Power Play" and chastised the governor for "playing a deadly game of
chicken with the Legislature." 9 Dr. Miles McCue, a member of Governor Sununu's hand-
picked Task Force on AIDS, editorialized in the Boston Globe that the mandatory testing
proposal was "reckless with regard to its ignorance." 10 Even the Manchester Union
Leader, the only statewide daily newspaper, generally supportive of Sununu, criticized
the governor's "browbeating politics." 11 The press also reported, in a limited way, a "man
on the street" sense from the public which indicated a measure of public support for man-
datory premarital testing. There seemed to be low recognition of the distinction between
consequences of confidentiality leaks for syphilis and AIDS. A breach of confidentiality
concerning AIDS causes more than embarrassment. At the present time, it can threaten
the loss of one's housing, one's employment, life insurance, health insurance, and poten-
tially one's medical and dental providers. The absence of a public education program—
as the bill would have provided— left the public unable to debate the merits of the very
issue that had been placed between the bill and its passage.
The New Hampshire Medical Society's Infectious Disease section moved to convince
its Executive Committee to take action with the governor. The society directed its action
to two fronts: first, to try to deal directly with Governor Sununu, and, second, to try to
kill the amendment when it was introduced in the Senate. A meeting between the governor
and a group representing the medical society proved inconclusive, and the society's ef-
forts were then directed toward the upcoming hearing in the Senate where the premarital
amendment was to be introduced.
In both the House and the Senate some of the debate over the premarital testing plan
began to center around which presidential aspirants supported it. Bush supporters, Kemp
and Dole supporters, lined up on the side of their candidate to show their relative strength.
Having dared the legislature to defy him, the governor's supporters and opponents, Re-
publican and Democrat, fell in line. Having neglected to take any strong positions or to
initiate any action in the first four months of the six-month legislative session, and having
placed himself firmly in a box on this issue, Governor Sununu had to rally the House and
Senate leadership to hew to his position.
The first draft of the amendment was issued from the governor's legal counsel only
hours before the Senate hearing was to be held. A copy had to be leaked to Public Health.
The draft amendment by the governor's office would have gutted the money needed for
education and contact tracing by using most of it for premarital testing. It breached confi-
dentiality and eliminated pre- and post-test counseling. The process for testing and test-
results reporting was replete with dead ends. As the result of conversations between the
attorney general's office and the Speaker's office, the amendment had been completely
rewritten by April 28, the day of the Senate hearing. Provisions were added to allow the
testing to be self-supporting, the syphilis provision was quietly deleted, and some of the
procedural issues were clarified.
The Senate hearing on April 28 was chaired by Sen. Elaine Krasker, the leading Senate
sponsor of the bill. Of the many speakers that morning who addressed the committee,
only one urged the adoption of the governor's/Speaker's/Senate president's amendment:
an Ernest Schapiro, representing Lyndon LaRouche.
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One speaker after the next urged the committee to pass the bill as it arrived from the
House and not to include the governor's amendment. The director of the New Hampshire
Civil Liberties Union argued that the state would be unable to prove it had a compelling
reason to require the invasive procedure of drawing blood, because the state could do
nothing with the results of that test; it couldn't offer a cure, stop the marriage, or prevent
conception. Dr. James Kahn of Deerfield warned the committee that "many of the people
we need to reach are socially ostracized, medically indigent, and otherwise disconnected."
He pointed out that these are not the people who are already accepting enough of society's
norms to be getting married.
At the close of the hearing, the committee unanimously passed the bill without the pre-
marital amendment. The bill came to the full Senate for a vote on May 5, having been
through the Senate Finance Committee without a hearing, and it was there that the gover-
nor's staff went to work. They leaned on senators for hours, making promises and
threats, "bullying and bartering some members into changing their positions," according
to the Concord Monitor
.
n On a roll call vote, the bill passed 13 to 11 with the premarital
provision attached.
Headed for Conference Committee to resolve the dispute (or kill the bill, as Conference
Committee must have unanimous votes and acceptance by both chambers), the pressure
increased with the approaching deadline in the Senate. The deadline for bills and commit-
tees of conference reports to be heard on the floor of the Senate was May 15. In order to
hear a bill or report after that date and vote on it, the House and Senate required a two-
thirds vote to suspend the rules.
The Senate vote on May 5 left ten calendar days to have conference committees ap-
pointed by both chambers, have the committees meet, deliberate, and concur, and have
both houses accept their version of the bill. By this time, national newspapers were re-
porting on the issue, including the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. 13 The
debate was being heard as well from the Cabinet in the White House, where Surgeon
General Koop and Education Secretary Bennett were evidently arguing over AIDS test-
ing and AIDS education. 14
At Public Health, an eerie kind of calm had settled in. The state budget bill was headed
into Conference Committee; other Division bills were in their final stages of negotiation;
press teams roamed the halls; but Division staff had no comment and made only the most
necessary, and briefest, forays out.
Since the House had passed the bill without the premarital amendment and the Senate
had passed the bill with the amendment, the House Speaker and Senate president ap-
pointed a Conference Committee. Despite their position in support of premarital testing,
both leaders appointed members on both sides of the issue.
The group met in the basement of the State House, in the cramped offices of Senator
Krasker. A fire in the Legislative Office Building days earlier had left many legislators
"homeless" and had destroyed a great many files. The Conference Committee, after
some rousting about, voted to include a sanitized version of the premarital testing plan.
They added funds to conduct the testing so as not to have the costs of the testing be taken
from the main AIDS bill. They also worked out a timing mechanism for reporting to town
clerks that a couple had taken the test such that the town clerk would not be able to deduce
who had had a positive test. Both Senator Krasker and Representative Copenhaver made it
clear they didn't much like having to include even a sanitized premarital provision, but
they were concerned that the bill would not prevail without it.
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On May 13, just two days before the Senate deadline, the Senate approved the Confer-
ence Committee's report on a voice vote. The Conference Committee report then had to
be adopted by the House.
That day, Representative Copenhaver called the other sponsors, and Public Health, to
say she just could not sign the report. She indicated that she would fight against the Con-
ference Committee report on the floor. 15
She then went to the members of the House one by one and explained why it would be
wrong to include the premarital provision. She argued the impropriety of the governor's
having introduced an amendment after the bill had already been passed by the House; she
talked about the anguish of those testing positive who eventually are found to be negative,
and graphically depicted the plight of couples and families with their weddings on hold
and their reputations ruined. She dared the House members to stand up for what she knew
to be right, in spite of possible retribution from the governor and the wishes of their own
Speaker. Other House sponsors worked the floor with her, letting members know that they
had not been consulted, that the testing was expensive and would yield few positives, that
even the U.S. Surgeon General had written to say that mandatory premarital testing was a
poor solution.
The House, in an emotional session, rallied to Representative Copenhaver' s call and
rejected the Senate's version, with a roll call vote of 136 yeas to 165 nays. Then, in a show
of strength, the House voted 157 to 138 to convene a new Conference Committee, with
instructions that they consider the bill only on the basis of the House-passed version, that
is, without the premarital provision. The Speaker replaced Marion Copenhaver on the
new Conference Committee, but included members who had strongly and eloquently
supported the House position. This gesture of support for the House's position, although
it was antithetical to his own stance, earned him respect from his colleagues, as he had
promised to listen to the House's voice when elected Speaker.
A first moral crusade had been fought and won. A second Committee of Conference
on the AIDS bill was to then convene in some haste. The May 15 deadline for bills and
reports on the Senate floor had passed; therefore, a two-thirds majority vote would be
required to suspend the rules and allow a bill to be voted on. The House had locked itself
into a tight position, making negotiation difficult. Sen. Edward Dupont, the new Senate
majority leader, was a conferee, and he represented the Senate president. A small room
had been located on the first floor of the State House. It was packed and hot, and press
were in attendance. A unanimous vote was needed or the bill would die.
Senator Dupont opened by roundly criticizing the House for sending in conferees
whose hands were tied. He talked about how committed he was to the premarital testing,
indicating that, as an original sponsor of the bill, had he known then what he knew now,
the bill would have been introduced with the provision included. He voiced the plea that
had been used over and over by the Speaker and Senate president, that "if only one baby is
saved by this," then the amendment is worth it. He said he would compromise by allowing
anyone who was phobic about needles to be excused from the test by an order of the court.
The House members indicated that this really did not represent much of a compromise.
Representative Kerk, a new conferee and House member, proposed an alternative that
had been discussed earlier with some of the medical society physicians. Why not, he sug-
gested, have a mandatory premarital questionnaire, and allow people to elect to take the
test if they answered yes to some of the questions. Senator Dupont went off to seek guid-
ance on this idea, and returned later to say that it was unacceptable.
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An emotional burst from Rep. Ednapearl Parr brought the issue to a head. Why, she
shouted, did they demand to test "innocent people" when they should be testing drug
addicts and homosexuals and— In a level voice, Senator Krasker silenced her by saying,
"Ednapearl, they are all innocent. There are no guilty people in this."
In the quiet that followed, Senator Dupont explained that this was exactly why the pre-
marital group would be so useful. It was precisely their "innocence" that meant their
subjection to mandatory testing would open the way for mandatory testing of "other
groups." He did not elaborate. After another break to receive instructions, he returned
and announced that he would sign the Conference Committee report without the premari-
tal provision included. But, he added, he would fight its entry onto the floor, and block
the necessary two-thirds vote. He concluded, "I have the votes."
This, then, was the plan. If Dupont could indeed block the bill's entry onto the floor,
the bill would technically die in Conference Committee. No senator would actually have
to vote against the AIDS bill, and the governor would not have to fulfill his threat of a veto.
However, in his last plea, Dupont had revealed the purpose of the governor's amend-
ment. It was clear now why the amendment had been proposed, why the governor had
called it "a start, a small beginning," and why he had repeated that this was a legal issue, a
civil rights issue, a political issue, but not a medical issue. For indeed, if you can mandate
testing of a low-risk group, even when the results of that test cannot be used by the state
for any purpose, then it is a first step to begin testing of any group, especially any group
that those in power find unacceptable. Using AIDS as a mechanism to curtail a group's
civil rights is certainly a legal issue and a political issue, not a medical issue. But it is
exactly this use of medicine to achieve results that have nothing to do with health that is
most distressing.
On May 19, Senator Krasker 's motion to suspend the rules and allow the AIDS bill to
be heard on the floor failed in a 12-12 Senate vote, and the bill died.
Conclusion
HIV testing is an issue ripe for distortion and political manipulation. Because so much is
not known, and since much that is known has not been clearly enunciated, there is wide-
spread public fear. To this is added a growing distrust of the health care community's
truthfulness in assessing the real risks of AIDS. Suspicion that medicine is deliberately
understating the risks of transmission and is wrong in its assessment that HIV infection
cannot be transmitted through casual contact makes public education a particularly diffi-
cult endeavor.
In New Hampshire's experience last year, the problem stemmed from too little educa-
tion of the public and elected officials to permit genuine debate and unbiased consider-
ation of the AIDS issue. For our sister New England states, the issue by now may be not
too little information, but too much. There are many voices talking, authoritatively, about
AIDS testing, and the public and media have little to help them sift through the morass of
speculation, hyperbole, and fact. The New Hampshire experience had three bad long-
term consequences: (1) it left scarred relationships between decision makers, making
future planning difficult; (2) it further confused, and therefore frightened, an already
wary public; and (3) by killing the bill, it delayed care, counseling, and public education
for at least one year— one year longer for the disease to spread among a poorly informed
public.
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To avoid New Hampshire's debacle, our sister states need to build a central coalition
whose "voice" is reasoned and whose membership represents a broad spectrum of re-
spected medical and community organizations. Without such a coalition, politicians and
some media will exploit conflicting opinions and further erode the public's confidence
that it is receiving honest information. In concert with governors, a central coalition
should establish a plan that considers all the many ramifications of AIDS and HIV infec-
tion with respect to states and lays out concrete actions. Then, and only then, should the
doors be opened to introduce legislation. A well-informed coalition and a well-informed
governor can prevail upon legislators to withhold bills until they have been educated and
brought into the fold. With legislative, gubernatorial, and coalition support, bills have not
only a better chance of passage, but also a better chance of producing useful information
for press and public to consider. Harassment and discrimination have no place in the con-
sideration of disease-control measures. We can and must do better. M^
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